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ABSTRACT
Productlines of traditionally heterogeneous financial institutions are rapidly
fusing into a homogeneous blend, institutions and market structures are reshaping
themselves to lower the cost of serving customer demand for financial services.
This paper contends that contemporary adaptations exploit scope economies rooted
in technological change and deposit-insurance subsidies to innovative forms of risk-
bearing.
As they reorient work flows, financial firms are simultaneously restructuring
their organizations to lower net burdens from government regulation. Alternative
state and federal regulatory and legislative bodies compete vigorously for the
regulatory business of developing institutional hybrids.Evolution of Federal
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Althoughthe term is applied almost universally to events in the financial-
services industry, dereulation has become a misleading catchword for the evolu-
tionary fading away of lines of market cleavage that delimit inherited patterns of
competition. Jimmy 1iurante's signature line, "Everybody wants to get into the
act," sums up the landscape of contemporary financial competition. With and
without the explicit blessing of specialized financial regulators, deposit institu-
tions, brokerage firms, and insurance companies are feverishly expanding into one
another's traditional bailiwick. Providing opportunities for customers to transact
these diverse lines of financial business in a single-statement framework is
restructuring front-office and back-office work flows. It is turning a growing
number of banking lobbies into pinstriped caricatures of Istanbul's famous covered
bazaar and back offices into electronic transactions and communications centers.
I. An Introductory Overview
In at least two ways, deregulation misrepresents the nature of the adjust-
ments taking place. First, it locates the impetus for change in the political arena
to the exclusion of the economic one. It intimates that exogenous governmental
policy decisions are causing nontraditional competitors to enter geographic
markets and product lines from which exclusionary laws drafted by clever lawyers
had previously shut them out. Such a perspective fails to acknowledge the prior
breakdown of the inherited system of exclusionary regulation or to raise the issue
of why society might suddenly reveal a preference for abandoning rather than
rebuilding legal barriers to entry in the financial-services industry. To analyze
these issues, one must focus on scope economies (resources saved by moving from
specialized to joint production of individual goods) and on opportunities forstructural arbitrage. By structural arbitrage, I mean adaptive changes in a firm's
organizational form designed to lighten its tax and regulatory burdens. In turn, one
must recognize that structural arbitrage creates costs and benefits for government
officials that require reactive changes in operative tax codes and regulations.
Contemporary realignment of federal and state regulatory frameworks is largely a
process of competitive reregulation.
The second way that deregulation misleads is in suggesting that the process
involves the complete abandonment of regulation rather than its selective and
partial relaxation. Talking about deregulation diverts attention from regulations
that are being tightened or left unaltered and from reallocations of regulatory
authority.Particularly with respect to destabilizing incentives established by
deposit-insurance pricing and coverage, unchanged and tightened restrictions play
at least as important a role in shaping financial market structures as the particular
regulations undergoing relaxation.
EndogtofMarketStructure. Rationalizations for laws intended to segment
interinstitutional competition presume that, while scale economies may be impor-
tant in finance (so that small firms need to be protected), scope economies are not.
Contemporary events and a conjectural reading of cross-section evidence on the
jointness and ti-shapedness of commercial-bank costs functions (Benston, Berger,
Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1983) suggest that both halves of this presumption are
wrong. In the financial-services industry scope has always been correlated with
firm size, making it hard to isolate the role played by economies of joint
production in the growth and profitability of successful firms.
This paper depicts the fusion of financial-services competition as confirming
the contestability model of inultimarket competititon (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig,
1983). Contestability theory maintains that, far from being an exogenous determi-
nant of industry performance, market structure adapts through entry and exit to-3-
permit customer demand to be served at minimum cost. The desegmentation of
financialmarketsinvolves the expansion of low-cost producers at the expense of
high-cost ones.
Regulatory interference slows the rate of adaptation by imposing entry
restrictions and corresponding avoidance costs on particular firms. But in a free
society in which multiple legislatures and regulatory agencies compete --- under
jurisdictions that overlap -- for regulatees, tax receipts, and/or budget funcs,
authorities can only induce great or long-lasting divergences between the actual
and the cost-minimizing market structure when continuing or transition Costs
associated with structural arbitrage are high.
Implications for Deposit Insurance. In the financial-services industry, any act of
regulatory avoidance or reregulation sets into motion two interacting processes
(Kane, 1981):
1. Adaptive responses by competing state and overlapping federal
regulators (and their supporting political coalitions) to reoptimize
their spheres of control by adjusting the rules under which the
financial-services gameis played;
2. Adaptive responses by various types of financial institutions (includ-
ing foreign ones) to minimize regulatory burdens by arbitraging
differences in applicable regulatory structures.
Because the inherited system of deposit insurance subsidizes unregulated forms of
deposit-institution risk-bearing, changes in organizational form and expansions in
financial-institution product lines may also arbitrage differences between the price
of risk-bearing in capital markets and the 8-1/3 basis-point explicit premium paid
for federal deposit insurance (Buser, Chen, and Kane, 1981). Since at least the late
1970s, structural arbitrage ias has combined with increasing volatility in interest
rates to expand FDICandFSLIC risk exposure faster than these agencies have been-4-
able to reset their conceptionsof contingent claims on theirresources.Thesteady
expansion of the resulting subsidy to risk-bearing creates a growing need for
I undwn ental ref orrn of deposit-insurance agencies' pricing, coverage, and failure-
resolution policies. Although we lack the space to discuss them here, the shifting
of deposit-insurance subsidies explains a series of anomalous features in the
contemporary pattern of financial-services competition.
2. Exclusionary Rulesydance, and the Cost of Multiproduct Operation
To model the costs of multiproduct operation and of laws meant to enforce
product specialization, it is sufficient to focus on quantities of two goods, X1 and
X2. (J3y interpreting X1 as a vector of N-I outputs, the formulation can easily be
generalized to any number of outputs.) Economies of scope exist when the total
costs of producing the two goods jointly, C(X1,X2), is less than the combined cost,
of producing the same amounts of each good separately. Econo-
mies of scope are economies of joint production. They occur when two outputs
share one or more capital or labor inputs in the production process, either directly
or through networking. A traditional example concerns unallocable joint costs that
occur in constructing and operating a multipurpose dam to produce electricity,
flood control, and recreational services. Abstracting from offsetting costs of
managerial coordination, a financial intermediary's computer, communications
network, and branch-office system should make it cheaper for it to offer
standardized deposit, loan, brokerage, and insurance products in combination than a
series of specialized producers could produce the same products on a stand-alone
basis.
During the last 13 years, technological change (in the form of the computer-
ization of record-keeping and transacting, the robotization of teller functions, and
expanding telecommunications links with customers, services, and financial mar-
Lets) has increased the role of multipurpose capital equipment in producing-5-
financial services.The desirability of spreading the Costs of operating this
Utelernation equipment across additional product lines underlies therapid progress
toward honiogeriization of function observed for differenttypes of financial
intermediaries. It also explains the attraction of nonfinancial firms (particularly
thosein data-processing and communications) into financial services.
TheGeneric Financial-Services Firm. Homogenization in the product lines of
formerly specialized financial institutions leads to the concept of the all-purpose
financial-services firm: a generic reconceptualization of financial-industry bound-
aries broad enough to encompass the range of activities being undertakenby
contemporary institutional corn petitors. The financial-services firm (FSF) pro-
duces informational and transactional products for a base of customers with whom
it has established relationships.Informational products include advice, data-
processing, and communications services. Transactional products include execution
of trading and payment orders, bidirectional funds rental, and risk-bearing services.
To deliver any financial service, an FSF must exchange information with its
customers. Customers and FSFs exchange information by means of information
media, which today include: person-..o-person exchange, paper evidences (such, as
loan agreements, checks, and deposit slips); telephonicmessages; magnetic entries
on striped plastic cards, tapes, or discs; and keyboard-actuated video displays.
These media connect the customer with the particular FSF product he wishes to
use.
Increasingly, financial services register on and occur through an electronic
transactions and record-keeping system. This system employs three kinds of
productive processes:(I) techniques 1r maintaining and communicating with
remote data bases; (2) techniques for executing transactions; and (3) techniques for
delivering services to customers. Becaue the first two types of technology are
known as back-off ice technology, the thud type is called front-office technology.-6-
Elements of front-office technology confront the customer every day: brick-and-
mortar offices, automated teller machines, drive-in teller windows, and home-
based electronic equipment such as telephones and computer terminals.
Among the elements that the customer does not see are the complicated
interfaces that connect FSFs across the transactions system. Efficient production
requires that FSFs belong to networks in which they both compete with and serve
one another. With respect to back-office services, competing banks have always
shared some resources, interbank cooperation is exemplified by such developments
as regional clearinghouses, check standardization, ATM networks, and loan syndi-
cations. At the same time that brokerage firms and correspondent banks act as
wholesalers of back-office services to FSF customers, they compete with these
customers for front-office business. Federal Reserve Banks play a quadruple role.
They not only supply correspondent and communications services to firms they
compete against, they are even empowered to regulate their competitors' activi-
ties. Moreover, as regulators they compete against other federal agencies and
state banking departments.
c2sofExclusio!aLLRules. This section states a condition for exclusionary rules
to be successful and develops a measure of these rules' social costs, A key
component of both equations is Cart the cost of perfectly circumventing or
avoiding a given set of restrictions against multiproduct operation in the most
efficient way known at the time. Opportunities for circumvention act as a brake
on the welfare burden of regulation, keeping this burden lighter than it would
otherwise be.
By construction, Ca,r is nonnegative. Avoidance costs may be conceived as
the incremental costs of creating an unregulated substitute product or institutional
arrangement. Exariples include the extra costs of running a zero-balance sweep
operation to circumvent the prohibition against paying explicit interest on demanddeposits or the extra costs of offering a prohibited product through a subsidiary
corporation or holding-company affiliate. Whether X1 and X2 are produced jointly
or singly depends on which of the following costs is smaller:
C(X1,X2) + Ca,r versus C1(X1)+C2(X2). (I)
This condition confronts only half of the resource waste inherent in effective
regulation. The social cost of a regulatory exdusion is the sum of two items: (1)
administrative costs of promulgating and enforcing the restriction and (2) the
lesser of Ca,r and the forfeited economies of scope [C(X1)+C(X2)—C(X1,x2)1
The Impact of Technological Change.Technological change lowers both
components of the lefthand side of condition (1).It increases the role of
multipurpose "telemation" equipment in financial-services production and makes it
easier for management to coordinate unregulated substitute arrangements such as
sweep accounts or the activities of an array of subsidiary firms. Hence, it makes
product-line homogenization increasingly likely.
Unless regulators increase administrative and avoidance costs to offset
technological change, exclusionary rules would tend to lose their effectiveness.
However, the social costs of regulation could rise, fall, or remain the same. We
look at constraints that regulatory competition places on the behavior of regulators
in Section 3.
This paragraph illustrates numerically how technological change might under-
mine exclusionary rules. Let us suppose that prior to a change in technology
C(X1,X2) equalled 8 and Ca,r was 3 while C1(X1)+C2(X2) was 10. Because scope
economies of 2 fall short of avoidance costs, the exclusionary rule would succeed
and specialized producers would be observed. The social cost of regulation would
be the sum of forgone economies of scope (2) and administrative costs (which we
arbitrarily assume to be 3). Next, let us assume that innovation drives the costs of
joint production to 7 and avoidance costs to 2, without affecting the costs ofspecialized operation. This change makes the exclusionary rule unenforceable,
because it increases the costs of forgone economies of scope to 3 while reducing
avoidance costs to 2.To reduce the burden of regulation, product-line
homogenization would develop. If regulator costs remained unchanged at 3, the
social costs of regulation would stay at 5, but avoidance costs would now register
in place of forgone scope economies.
Are Partly Rooted in the Mispricing of Deposit-Insurance.
'vispricing deposit-insurance guarantees provides an unintended subsidy that
reduces an insured institution's exposure to risk in product-line expansions. When
brokers and insurers incorporate a deposit institution into their operation and when
deposit institutions diversify into brokerage and insurance activities, some of the
blessing of deposit insurance extends to these firms' nondepository affiliates. This
is because, as a practical matter, it is impossible for deposit-insurance bureaucrats
to prevent an insured deposit institution from assisting its troubled affiliates and
subsidiaries whenever management perceives such assistance to be in its own best
interest (Eisenbeis, 1983a).
Currently federal deposit insurance fully guarantees an institution's deposit
accounts up to $100,000 per distinct combination of accountholders, with accounts
held singly and jointly and accounts held in different institutions each afforded a
separate insurance status. To exploit the opportunity for individuals to multiply
their coverage, funds brokers have developed software and communications facili-
ties that distribute multimillion-dollar concentrations of wealth across individual
institutions in $100,000 pieces. In recent months, such brokers are said to have
played a significant role in funneling deposits to seriously troubled banks and
thrifts eager to pay a premium rate or. $100,000 CDs.
Deposit-insurance guarantees are supported by explicit premiums of 1/12 of
one percent of total (insured and uninsured) deposits booked at domestic offices.-9-
Currently, this premium is rebatable iu pdrtforFDIC clients, but not for FSLIC
customers.
l3ecause this pattern of explicit pricing is not sensitive to differences in
either interest-rate volatility or an FSE's leverage, asset, or affiliated-institution
risk, client risk-taking rrust be regulated directly. It is instructive to view capital-
adequacy requirements tnd back-up regulatory penalties for excessive risk—taking
as implicit premiums that agency minagers vary to control these and other
bureaucratically recognhed forms of risk-taking.
Three things are wrong with this coverage and pricing system. First, it is
allocationally inefficient:By underpricing risk, it wastes scarce resources.
Second, it is distributionally unfair: It overcharges conservatively managed deposit
institutions and forces them to stand ready to bail out high-flying competitors.
Third, it fosters financial instability: It subsidizes deposit—institution risk-taking
most when markets are most volatile and loads the burden for financing this
subsidy onto both conservatively managed deposit institutions that are sure to
survive any crisis and taxpayers at large. The implicit liability facing surviving
institutions is underscored in the still-unresolved failure of a state-insured institu—
tion in Lincoln, Nebraska in late 1983. When the state insurance fund was revealed
to have only $2 million to cover $70 million in guarantees, politicians immediately
proposed assessing surviving finanäal institutions for the difference.
FDICand FSLIC premiumstructures subsidize unregulated forms of risk-
bearing. They lead dynamically to a continual search for (and expansion of) such
new forms of risk-taking as entry into futures markets, investment banking, or
insurance underwriting. They also make bureaucratic conceptions of operative
categories of deposit-institution risk-taking play the pivotal role in preventing a
system breakdown.
Federal deposit insurers would not end up subsidizing risk-taking if they were
quick to adapt their regulatory policies to emerging problems (Bierwag and-10-
KuulnldIl,1983).Butthisis merely a counsel of perfection. Unless bureaucratic
lilcentivesystems canbemade to mimic those of profit-orientedenterprises, this
counsel ofperfectionhas no empirical importance.Bureaucratsareinherently
slowerinresponding to changesininterest-rate volatility andother emerging
forms of risk than private insurers would be. Politically appointedagency heads
typically have short horizons and are sensitive to political constraints that overlay
an agency's strictly economic interests in the decisions it makes. This leaves
government bureaucracies markedly lower inptive efficiency than value-
maximizing firms, Given this relative weakness and a financial-services environ-
ment changing as rapidly as our own, it is poor public policy to require anagency to
follow policies that thrust its adaptive efficiency in protecting its economic
interests into a pivotal role. Such an agency spends itsenergy playing catch-up,
much like a sprinter who is habitually late out of the starting blocks or a baseball
pitcher who slips persistently behind in the count.
3.StructuralArbitragdCompetitiveRereguIation
Through structural arbitrage and the threat or promise of structural arbi-
trage, value-maximizing managers of U.S. deposit institutions may to a large
extent choose the set of laws and the particular regulatory bodies by which they
are governed. This is because the set of restrictions applicable to their business
operations and the particular agencies assigned to oversee their behavior vary with
how they resolve a series of options concerning the institution's structural form.
The broadest set of options concerns the type of charter under
which a deposit institution el€cts to operate. First, it may charter or recharter
itself as a corn mnercial bank, a savings-and-loan association (S&L), or a savings bank
(MSB). Rechartering may be accomplished by charter conversion or by merging
into an institution that already has the desired charter type. Second, eachtype of
diarter is avalidhle alternately rum state or federal authorities. While commer——11—
cial banks and S&Ls are chartered in all 50 states, MSB charters are available in
only 17. Whenever the location of an instilution's offices is not predetermined,
these opttons generate a space of as many as 120 (=2x51+18) different regulatory
i cro—ci ii flat es."
Most of these niicro-cliinates involve multiple regulators and dimensions of
additional choice. For example, federally chartered commercial banks (national
banks) have the Comptroller of the Currency as their primary regulator, but are
subject to additional oversight from the Federal Reserve and the FDIC. Although
primarily under the supervision of its state banking department, a state-chartered
commercial bank typically subjects itself to federal co—supervision. This occurs
whenever it is federally insured, with an even richer regulatory climate coming on
line if it chooses to become a member of the Federal Reserve System.'
Until 1979, all savings banks were state-chartered and insured either by the
FDIC, a state insurance fund, or both. Federal charters have gained in popularity
since the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act (DIA) of 1982, which
permits a converting MSB to retain FDIC insurance. Prior to the DIA, federal
savings banks had to be insured by the FSLIC, which meant that a MSB could
convert only when the prior insurer(s) and the FSLIC could agree on compensation
for shifting the liability associated with the insurance guarantee over to the FSLIC.
Micro-climates for S&Ls are in some respects richer than for MSBs. First,
S&Ls have an institutionally specialized federal regulator (the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board or FHLBB) and deposit-insurance fund (the FSLIC). In addition, most
States have separate agencies regulating banks and S&Ls. Five states also operate
insurance funds for state-chartered thrifts (Massachusetts, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania).
A second variety ol option concerns the foria of institutional ownership. For
iitriterswho elect against seeking a cotiimnercial-ban charter, the opportunityI 2—
exists to operate undr either stockholder or mutual ownership. Theoutcome of
this election affects the incentive structure under whichmanagement functions, in
that managers of stockholder institutions are subject to SEC disclosurerequire-
rnents and to possible dismissal in proxy fights and unfriendly takeovers, on theone
hand; but are able to work out a rich variety of stock-based compensation schemes
or.even to participate in leveraged buyouts, on the other. For existing institutions,
the conversion option is effectively One—way: from mutual to stockownership.
For stock firms, the most important option is whether or not to allow the
stock to be owned by a holding company (i.e., to interpose a layer of indirect
ownership -- a corporate stockholder -- between the deposit institution and its
ultimate owners). Deposit-institution holding companies (HCs) aredifferentially
taxed and regulated as compared to deposit institutions themselves.Deposit-
institution HCs are subject in some states to additional state regulation and to
federal regulation of permissible activities under the Fed or FHLBB.However,
under special provisions of federal law, S&L HCs are currently exempted from the
layer of FHLBB regulation as long as the HC chooses to own only one S&L.
Deposit—institution HCs are also subject to disclosure regulation by the SEC from
which deposit institutions themselves are exempt, but HCsmay avoid SEC
oversight by keeping the HC's value of equity and number of stockholders within
legislated limits, Notwithstanding this exposure to incremental regulation, the HC
device provides opportunities to circumvent many restrictions on deposit-institu-
tion activities. Nonbank affiliates may undertake activities that deposit institu-
tions cannot. Moreover, tax and regulatory burdens even on permissible activities
may be lightened in important ways.
A similar set of options exists even for non-HG institutions. This concerns
whether or not to use subsidiary pi2ps (or, in the case of deposit-institution
subsidiaries of HCs, affiliated corporations) to operate various lines of deposit--13-
iJbttutionbusiness. Spinning off some productlines may lightenthe burden of
fedtralcapital-adequacy requirements and, not only circumvent interstate and
lntristate restrictions on office locations, but dilow individual product lines to be
procucedin themicro-climate inwhichthey can generate thehighestafter-tax
prolit.
ConpitionAmong Legislatures and Regulatory Bodies. Markets for regulatory
serices should be regarded as nearly as contestable as those of regulatees. This
contestability makes applicable laws and the regulatory postures of different
authorities partly endogenous. Deposit institutions' structural choices have eco-
nornic consequences for legislatures and for turf-maximizing regulatory agencies.
Their desire to influence the outcomes of regulatee choices leads these bodies to
coin )ete for the "regulatory business" of potential clients. This competition gives
depc sit-institution lobbyists political leverage with which to play authorities off
against each other to win regulatory forbearance for circumvention activities and
to educe favorable changes in legislation or agency rules.
Competition between overlapping federal and state regulators looks in the
short run like wasteful duplication, but leads in the long run to better-adapted
regulatory rules. When the opportunity cost of an exclusionary rule rises, pressures
develop to soften the rule,it is unlikely that laws meant to hold deposit
institutions out of brokerage and insurance activities and brokers and insurance
companies out of deposit-institution markets can stand up indefinitely against
opportunities to reduce product costs created by growing scope economies. While
it is natural for lobbyists from each industry to fight a rearguard political action to
delay change, Americ:an politics and ideology favor innovation over regulation in
many ways. In one way or another, low-cost schemes for producing and distributing
products are able to push aside high-cost ones. This is partly because reregulation
is d ompe1itive process that responds to economic as well as political forces.-14-
Banks' recent success in winning favorable product-line regulation in Dela-
ware and South Dakota ihustrates the process. Legislatures in these states have
given specialized subsidiaries of out-of-state HCs long-desired freedoms and
powers, particularly withrespectto credit-card and insurance operations.
Especially if(asI contend) economies of joint production are increasing overtime,
scope economies give deposit institutions an incentive to probe nationwide for
political weak points in exclusionary policies. At the same time, the tax, budget,
and employment benefits of winning regulatory refugees from other jurisdictions
give bureaucrats and legislatures an incentive to trade in regulatory relaxation.
Similar pressures are fueling the drive for legislation permitting reciprocal
interstate banking at least within collections of neighboring states. Limited-
reciprocity laws have already passed the Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island legislatures, and are actively being considered by state officials in other
regions.Maine and New York permit acquisitions by out-of-state banking
organizations from any state that grants reciprocal privileges to banks in their
state, while Alaska allows virtually unconditional acquisition of in institu-
tions by out-of-state organizations.Lawsuits have been brought against the
limited-reciprocity laws on several grounds, including the claim that the Constitu-
tion's interstate-commerce clause precludes states from imposing conditions on
interstate entry. But by the time that these suits wend their way fully through the
courts, odds are good that either Congress will have already blessed these regional
experiments or interstate operation of deposit institutions will (as NOW accounts
and remote ATMs were in 1980) prove politically too well-established to be undone.
By realigning its organizational structure, a financial firm can not only
reorganize its regulatory cnvironment, it can also create pressure on legislatures
and regulators to rewrite the regulations under which it has to play. Competitive
reregulation occurs not only among officials in different states, but also between-15-
state and 1dcrai officials and between managers of different federalagencies.
Regulators try to forestall changes in L)rganizdtional form that would transfer some
or all of their traditional regulatees' business from their dominion to that of
another agency. When an agency suffers acumulativeloss of regulatees, it
maneuvers bothadministrativelyand in the legislative arena to recapture its
clientele, usually by lowering the net burden its regulations place on its clients.
Federal Reserve (and eventually Con;ressional) response to the Fed'smembership
problem of the 1960s and 1970s and the granting of new powers for state-chartered
institutions by state banking departments and legislatures inresponse to the
DIDMCA of 1980 exemplify the typical pattern of defensive reaction.
But it must never be forgotten that some regulatory agencies and legislatures
have capacities for a punitive retightening of regulations, with the U.S. Congress
having the greatest capacity of all. Congress can vote retaliatory preemptions of
state laws able to nullify particular legislative and regulatory actions inevery
state. It can also enact lengthy moratoria that suspend the opportunity to effect
particular types of organizational change. With the courts, Congress serves as the
final arbiter of disputes over alternative agencies' dominion and power.
Such disputes arise frequently at the federal level, especially between the
SEC and banking regulators (e.g., over who should be entitled to regulate brokers of
$100,000 CDs or discount-broke-age subsidiaries of deposit-institution HCs) and
between the Federal Reserve arid other federal regulators of deposit institutions.
In such contests, the Fed has special clout with Congress. This cloutgrows out of
the Fed's responsibilities for r iacroeconomic stability and its willingness to be
scapegoated for unfavorabie macroeconomic events. The Bush Task Group's
difficulties in dispersing the Fed's existing regulatory authority among more
specialized deposit-institutio agencies provides renewed evidence of the Fed's
special priracy in the arena of financial re;ulation.-16-
Distressirg Ijpications for Financial Stabiliand Public Policy Toward the
Nonbank Bank. Pre—existing conflicts over regulatory turf have been heightened in
the 1980s by cross—industry merger activity and product—line expansion by broker-
age, insurance, and deposit firms, The ongoing robotization and electronification
of systems for producing and delivering financial services is extending the
boundaries of regional competition arid sweeping the activities of individual deposit
institutions into new states and into the orbits of securities and futures-market
regulators and state insurance departments. These same forces are simultaneously
thrusting the activities of securities, futures, and insurance firms into the orbits of
state and federal deposit—institution regulators.
If the scope economies that are driving financial change did not include
subsidies to risk-bearing rooted in the mispricing of risk in federal deposit
insurance, structural arbitrage and competitive reregulation would shape up as
unambiguously resource-saving activities. However, until federal deposit insurers
explicitly price such unregulated risks as those associated with borrower default,
asset mat urity, balance—sheet leverage, affiliated institutions, and technological
change, social welfare is served by regulatory action to limit risk-taking by insured
firms. Although this concern justifies authorities' search for ways to constrain and
supervise a deposit institution's portfolio positions as well as risky activities
undertaken by any holding-company affiliates, it in no way proves the optimality of
the particular policies actually adopted.2
In the short run, bureaucratic competition for jurisdiction is leading various
state and federal regulators to facilitate forms of structural arbitrage that
undermine the inherited system of federal deposit insurance.Although this
arbitrage is vastly increasing the risk exposure of the FDIC and FSLIC, political
pressures and competition from other regulators have deflected the deposit--
insurance agencies from bringing these new risks under administrative control.-17-
Structural arbitrage is a game that may he played by brokers and insurers,
too.Theexistenceol patterns for circuriiveriting regulatory restrictions on
deposit-iiStItUtOfl activities makes deposit institutions more attractive candidates
tor takeuver by nondepository firms. Just as deposit—institution HCs can acquire
nondepository firms, iioridepository financial institutions (such as Merrill Lynch,
l)reyf us Corp., and Prudential Insurance) and even nonfinancial firms (such as Sears
Roebuck, J.C. Penney, National Steel, and the Parker Pen Co.) can acquire a
stockholier-owned deposit institution. If the acquired firm is a thrift institution or
is converted into one, its parent can avoid specialized federal oversight at the
holding-company level as long as it meets the definition of a unitary savings-and-
loan holding company. If the acquired firm is a bank, spinning off either the
demand-deposit or the commercial-loan side of the business makes it possible in
principle for the parent firm to elude Fed regulation as a bank HG. The hybrid
operation that results is known paradoxically as a "nonbank bank." In terms of the
operative definitions of the Bank Holding Company Act, the institution becomes a
"nonbank," even though as the holder of a bank charter it may continue to gather
time and savings deposits and to have these deposits insured by the FDIC.
Moreover, it even seems possible to circumvent restrictions on interstate banking
(or at least it seemed possible to the management of Dimension Corp.) by operating
a network of limited-service banks in different states.
To some deposit-institution regulators and trade associations, the freedom
afforded nonbank banks and unitary S&L HCs represents a glaring pair of loopholes
in the legislative fabric of exclusionary regulation (Eisenbeis, 1983b). During 1983,
Fed Chairman Volcker, citing a growing threat to the traditional separation of
banking from commerce and investment banking, repeatedly urged Congress to pass
a trnporary moratoriutri on nondepository acquisitions of deposit institutions and
on state and federal actions that allow different types of financial—services firms
to expana beyond their traditional lines of business.—18-
Volcker's position Or) the desirability of separation was not supported by other
federal regulators of deposit institutions.Although the Comptroller of the
Currency imposed his own moratorium on applications for de novo national-bank
charters by securities firms and other nonbanking businesses (extending from April
6, 1983 to at least March 31, 1984), his stated goal was to give Congress time to
redraw industry boundaries. His office continued to process pending applications
and to permit nonoepository firms to acquire ti national banks. In even
sharper contrast, the FD1C and FHLBB encouraged their regulatees to undertake
various forms of securities activities, with the FHLBB asymmetrically delaying
action on applications by brokerage firms and insurance companies to acquire
thrifts.
Lack of consensus among federal regulators and among financial-industry
trade associations left Congress reluctant to legislate. Congress hates to choose
sides in contests in which the social costs and benefits of alternative solutions are
highly uncertain. For this reason, Congress appeared willing to permit structural
arbitrage to set the future parameters of financial-services competition and to
accept any resulting strains on the deposit-insurance system.
Unwilling to accept these same strains, on December 14, 1983 the Federal
Reserve Board launched a bold reregulatory counterattack whose ultimate legality
remains uncertain. Frustrated by Congressional inaction, the Board unilaterally
broaceried its interpretation of what activities it holds to be "commercial loans"
and "demand deposits" under the Bank Holding Company Act. Its definition of
comrrrercial loans now includes sales of federal funds, extension of call loans to
brokers, and purchases of commercial paper, certificates of deposit and bankers
acceptances, while the category of demand deposits now includes NOW and super-
NOW accounts.3 These redefinitions force nonregistered corporate owners of most
nonbank banks to coni ront a p.ir of nested dilerrirnas. They must either furthernarrow theproduct lines of their rionhrik—bank subsidiary (e.g., by focusing on
Mi\ii)Asandnoncheckable deposit accounis, repurchase agreements, and consumer
and mortgage loans) or, withintwoyears. either divest themselves of the nonbank
bdnl< or register with the Fed as a bank HG and accept Fed dominion over its
activities. Sugaring the pill, the Fed simultaneously added five new powers to the
list of permissible activities for nonbankin; subsidiaries of bank HCs: issuing
money orders; arranging equity financing or real estate; underwriting and dealing
in government and specified money-market obligations; providing foreign-exchange
advisory services; and performing as a futures commission merchant.
In contrast to the customary regulatory practice of exempting or grand-
fathering all combinations undertaken under the old rules, the new definitions are
retroactive. However, the Fed proposed to permit combinations established before
December 10, 1982 to apply for exemptiuns based on hardship and fairness. The
cutoff date coincides with a Board ruling that Dreyfus Corp. would have to register
as a bank NC before it acquired a New Jersey bank (a ruling Dreyfus later
circumvented by acting under state authority).
These actions increase the expected value and the variance both of the Fed's
own administrative costs and of costs for unconventional entrants of circumventing
Fed regulation of bank holding companies. If Fed officials were truly confident in
the Board's authority to close the nonbank-hank loophole on its own, one must
suppose that Chairman Volcker would not have allowed a problem that so obviously
distressed him to fester for so long. The most logical way to read the Board's
action is as a forcing move designed to make Congress and the federal courts
referee the game of HG reregulation. Effectively, the Fed has demanded that
Congress and the Courts either sustain or overrule its redefinitions and choice of
cutoff date. Unlike Chairman Volcker's polite pleas for legislative action, this
public challenge raises constitutional questions Lhat cannot he turned aside. NoIndtter what the refereesfinally decide, their merely having the issue under
advisement andthe threat of additional unilateral actionby the Fed promise to
reduce for the duration prospective net benefits to brokers and insurers from
eriteri rigthebanking business.
4. Suinrnary
On the TV show, You Bet Your Life, .1ministeronce thanked Groucho Marx
for all the joy his work had brought into the world. Without missing a beat,
Groucho in turn thanked the minister for all the joy his work had taken out of it.
For brokers, insurance companies, and Dii•iension Corp., Chairman Voicker has
taken some of the joy out of the world of finance. The Board's action leaves the
opportunity for deposit institutions to enter brokerage and insurance asymmetric-
ally much greater than the opportunity for insurers and brokers to enter banking.
If brokers and insurers seek a legislative realancing of regulatory subsidies, and
come to appreciate the size of deposit-insurance subsidies and their role in
lessening the risks of product1ine extension by deposit institutions, they may tip
the balance of lobbying pressure toward depoit-insurance reform.
As long as scope economies and deposit-insurance subsidies remain substan-
tial, almost "everybody" should still want to get into each other's act. The Fed's
redefinition of its regulatory domain temportrily reduces the product-line flexibil-
ity of nonbank financial-services firms relative to banks. In raising the costs of
interstate and nonbank entry into banking markets and forcing the hand of
Congressional and judicial referees, the Fed transformed a routine regulatory price
war into a constitutional struggle over the limits of the Fed's power as finanicial
regulator and stabilizer of last resort.-21—
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in about three states, may 3 new bank elect against FDIC insurance and the
additional balance—sheet reulijtion that comes with it.Until universal reserve
reLluirehients dictated by Depo.itory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
(;(ritroi Act (DIDMCf\) ofI980 .me fuUy phased in, member banks face higher
resm ye reqwretnents thui 1h)r IH(H[)ers do.-22-
2Kane (1983) discusseshowdeposit-insurance subsidies are shifted to selected
borrowersand depositors, and suggests a series of reforms ranging from market-
value accounting for insured institutions to changes in FDIC and FSLIC risk
management, coverages, and pricing. Any subset of the reforms would allow scope
economies to be pursued without surrendering control of the aggregate risk to
which the FDIC and FSLIC are exposed.
3This act of redefinition recalls the Comptroller's unsuccessful attempt to rule
that off-premises AIMs were not legally branch offices whose locations were
subject to regulation under existing branch-banking laws.